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Abstract: The theoretical literature has argued that a centralized wage bargaining system 
may result in low regional wage differentiation and high regional unemployment differentials. 
The empirical literature has found that centralized wage bargaining leads to lower wage 
inequality for different skills, industries and population groups, but has not investigated its 
impact on regional wage differentiation. Empirical evidence in this paper for EU regions 
suggests that countries with more coordinated wage bargaining systems have lower regional 
wage differentials, after controlling for regional productivity and unemployment differentials. 
  
1. Introduction 
According to the theoretical literature, a centralized/coordinated wage bargaining 
system may cause low wage differentiation and high unemployment differentials across 
different skill levels, population groups, industries and regions. Under such a system, 
wages across all groups will converge to the market equilibrium for the high 
productivity group, or will be determined by the medium group. However, though the 
theoretical predictions are clear, empirical evidence is scant, especially for the effects 
on regional wage differentiation, with analysis hampered by data limitations at the 
regional level. 
The issue is of particular interest for the European Union. Average unemployment 
is higher in many of the EU countries than in the rest of the industrial world. Some have 
argued that this is often a regional problem. Indeed, many EU countries have high 
regional unemployment differentials. The fact that many EU countries have relatively 
low regional wage differentials suggests that regional wages do not adjust to equilibrate 
regional labor markets. Italy, for example, has the highest regional unemployment dif-
ferentiation in the EU, but one of the lowest regional wage differentials. Unemployment 
in the South is almost four times higher than in the North, and while productivity in the 
South is estimated to be only 80 percent of that in the North, wages are about 90 
percent. Taking into account that the cost of living is lower in the South, real wages in 
the South may actually be higher than in the North. Italy’s centralized wage bargaining 
system may be one of the reasons for its low wage differentiation across regions, which 
in part would explain its high regional unemployment imbalances. 
This paper argues that, indeed, coordinated wage bargaining systems and low 
regional wage differentiation are often linked. Empirical evidence for regions in 10 EU 863 
countries suggests that countries with less coordinated wage bargaining systems have 
higher regional wage differentials after controlling for regional productivity and 
unemployment differentials. The results are robust to estimation with instrumental 
variables, suggesting that the causality runs from the wage bargaining system to 
regional wage differentiation. Moreover, the results turn out to hold only for countries 
with high regional productivity differentials. Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests 
that a more flexible wage bargaining system could increase regional wage 
differentiation, reflecting regional productivity differentials.  
 
2. Costs and benefits of different wage bargaining systems 
The literature on the costs and benefits of various wage bargaining systems has 
primarily focused on the impact of each system on total unemployment and inflation. 
Bruno and Sachs (1985) found that centralized wage bargaining systems result in lower 
unemployment. Calmfors and Driffil (1988), Flanagan, Moene and Wallerstein (1993), 
and Cukierman and Lippi (1999) found that either centralized or very decentralized 
(firm level) bargaining systems result in lower unemployment and lower wages—while 
intermediate systems, with negotiation at the industry level, result in higher 
unemployment and higher wages. According to this evidence, extremes work better—a 
centralized bargaining system results in lower wage demands to internalize 
unemployment externalities, while a decentralized bargaining system results in a similar 
outcome because of high competition at the firm level. Both factors are absent when 
negotiations are at the industry level, since industry unions do not internalize the 
externality of their wage demands to the rest of the economy, and competition is low 
across different industries. However, this evidence is not robust as the literature reviews 
in OECD (1997 and 2006), Flanagan (1999) and Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) have 
shown, and the debate is still open. 
It has been argued that centralization/coordination of the wage bargaining process 
tends to reduce wage dispersion. In a coordinated wage bargaining system, in which 
wages are negotiated at the national level, unions may tend to favor the median voter. 
Uncertainty about wages after the negotiating process could result in the compression 
of wage differentials by unions. Pench, Sestito, and Frontini (1999) present a model 
with some empirical evidence for EU countries suggesting that in countries with 
centralized labor markets and large interregional productivity differentials decisions are 
tailored for the median region, resulting in a wage floor consistent with high 
unemployment in the less productive regions. Furthermore, unions may prefer a 
solidaristic wage policy, in which average productivity determines wages. 
If a country, in addition to a centralized wage bargaining system, has regional 
economic asymmetries, then it is in the interest of the union members in the more 
developed regions to have wages above equilibrium in the less developed regions. 
Saint-Paul (1997) argued that wages in Italy and Germany are determined in the leading 
regions, North in Italy and West in Germany, and that the union members in the leading 
regions have an incentive to keep wage differentiation low to slow down migration 
flows. Brunello, Lupi, and Ordine (2001) and Vamvakidis (2002) presented evidence 
for Italy suggesting that the wage in the South, the high unemployment region, is 
significantly affected by the unemployment rate in the North, the low unemployment 
region, while the unemployment rate in the South does not have a statistically 
significant impact. 864 
The parties with decision power in a centralized wage bargaining system may 
prefer a low regional wage differentiation. Workers and employers in the leading 
regions may not want higher competition from lower wages in the lagging regions, 
while the employed in the lagging regions prefer high wages. Employers in the leading 
regions would prefer lower wages in the lagging regions if this would also keep wages 
in the leading regions down. 
However, this would require high regional factor mobility, which is not always the 
case in Europe. The groups who would benefit from higher regional wage 
differentiation include the group of unemployed in the lagging regions, who do not 
have much of a bargaining power, and the employers in the lagging regions, who 
although may participate in the decision process they may be less powerful than the 
employers in the leading regions. 
In a country with a centralized/coordinated wage bargaining system and with 
wages determined by the leading region, low wage dispersion could coexist with high 
unemployment variation. A negative economic shock will increase unemployment in 
the lagging region without affecting wages, while the same shock in the leading region 
will reduce wages. As a result, the impact of a negative shock on employment will be 
smaller in the leading region and will not last as long as in the lagging region. If local 
wages were determined by local economic conditions, then temporary asymmetric 
economic shocks would not cause permanent regional unemployment disparities. Some 
empirical evidence are in support of this argument, showing that in a centralized wage 
bargaining system, negative shocks have a larger impact on poor regions (Pench, 
Sestito, and Frontini, 1999). Thomas (2002) finds similar evidence at the industry level. 
The empirical literature on wage bargaining systems reviewed in OECD (1997, 
2004 and 2006) finds a strong link between higher centralization/coordination of wage 
bargaining and lower earnings inequality for different skill levels and wage dispersion 
across different industries, but also across different population groups, such as for 
young or older workers and women. Furthermore, this seems to be the only robust 
result of this literature (see Flanagan (1999) Aidt and Tzannatos (2002)). One would 
expect this result to hold for regional wage disparities as well, but the empirical 
literature has not addressed this issue so far. 
 
3. Empirical evidences of wage differentiation from EU countries 
There is a link between the degree of coordination in the wage bargaining system 
and regional wage differentials in EU countries. The literature has found strong 
empirical evidence that centralized/coordinated wage bargaining systems lead to low 
wage inequality across different skills, industries and population groups. The theory 
suggests that the same result should hold for regional wage differentials. 
Most EU countries have relatively high unemployment rates and low labor market 
participation rates (Table 1a and 1b). Moreover, they have high regional unemployment 
variation (Table 2)—with Italy having by far the largest regional unemployment 
disparities in the EU—considerably more so than the U.S.. Although the regional mix 
of industries may contribute to this result, OECD (2000) finds a very low correlation 
between regional unemployment rates and the proportions of employment in 





Unemployment Rates in Selected OECD Countries: 1980-2007 
 1980  1990  2000  2007 
Euro  area 4.9 7.2 7.9 6.8 
Australia   6.1 6.6 6.3 4.3 
Austria    1.4  4.1  4.6  5.3 
Belgium  6.7 6.6 6.9 6.7 
Canada  7.5 8.2 6.8 6.0 
Germany         1.7  4.5  6.9  6.4 
Denmark  5.2 7.2 4.3 3.5 
Finland  4.6 4.6 9.8 6.6 
France  5.6 7.7 8.1 8.0 
Greece 2.8  7.0  11.7  8.6 
Ireland  7.5 13.1 4.3  4.8 
Italy 5.6  9.1  10.2  5.9 
Netherlands  3.9 5.7 3.0 3.3 
Norway  1.7 5.2 3.4 2.5 
Spain 9.3  12.1  10.8  8.1 
Sweden  2.0 1.6 4.7 4.6 
Switzerland  0.2 0.5 2.5 3.3 
UK  6.8 7.1 5.5 5.5 
USA  7.2 5.6 4.0 4.6 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook. 
Table 1.b 
Participation Rates in Selected OECD Countries: 1980-2007 
  1980 1990 2000 2007 
Euro  area  65.1 65.7 69.1 71.9 
Australia    70.6 74.4 75.1 77.8 
Austria    79.9  78.1  79.7  79.1 
Belgium  63.7 62.9 66.1 68.0 
Canada  72.6 77.7 77.2 79.9 
Germany         68.3  72.4  75.2  77.8 
Denmark  80.7 82.3 81.1 83.0 
Finland  75.2 76.7 74.5 75.4 
France  67.2 65.0 68.3 68.5 
Greece  56.9 60.2 63.0 65.6 
Ireland  63.5 63.4 69.7 74.3 
Italy  61.3 60.0 60.0 63.1 
Netherlands  66.5 68.8 77.4 79.8 
Norway  75.3 78.8 80.7 80.5 
Portugal  68.9 72.1 75.1 78.2 
Spain  58.7 59.0 64.9 73.2 
Sweden  81.5 84.5 77.8 79.5 
Switzerland  77.8 86.6 86.6 88.2 
UK  74.6 77.4 75.7 76.2 
USA  63.8 66.5 67.1 66.1 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook. 866 
Table 2 
EU, Unemployment Rate (Regional Coefficient of Variation) 
                              1990 1995  2000 
EU 65.5  60.1  65.9 
Belgium 43.8  41.1  57.8 
Denmark 22.2  28.2  22.5 
Germany 43.7  33.1  47.7 
Greece 27.4  24.3  17.3 
Spain 36.0  28.4  44.0 
France 24.8  22.3  29.4 
Ireland 12.9  11.8  23.2 
Italy 70.8  63.9  75.3 
Netherlands 26.9  19.3  33.2 
Austria …  36.0  33.8 
Portugal 50.6  30.3  32.5 
Finland 51.7  16.0  34.7 
Sweden 41.1  17.8  31.8 
UK 47.1  35.8  53.0 
USA 25.5  (1993)  27.0  27.5 
Source: Eurostat and U.S. Department of Labour. 
 
Table 3.a 
Collective Bargaining Characteristics of Selected OECD Countries, 1980-2000 





















Australia  80 80 80  48.0  40.0  25.0 
Austria  95 95 95  57.0  47.0  37.0 
Belgium  90 90 90  54.0  54.0  56.0 
Canada  37 38 32  35.0  33.0  28.0 
Denmark  70 70 80  79.0  75.0  74.0 
Finland  90 90 90  69.0  72.0  76.0 
France  80 90 90  18.0  10.0  10.0 
Germany  80 90 90  35.0  31.0  25.0 
Italy  80 80 80  50.0  39.0  35.0 
Japan  25 20 15  31.0  25.0  22.0 
Netherlands  70 70 80  35.0  25.0  23.0 
New 
Zealand  60 60 25  69.0  51.0  23.0 
Norway  70 70 70  58.0  59.0  54.0 
Portugal  70 70 80  61.0  32.0  24.0 
Spain  60 70 80  7.0  11.0  15.0 
Sweden  80 80 90  80.0  80.0  79.0 
Switzerland  50 50 40  31.0  24.0  18.0 
UK  70 40 30  51.0  39.0  31.0 
USA  26 18 14  22.0  15.0  13.0 
Source: OECD (1997 and 2004) 867 
The collective bargaining structure is usually assessed based on indices for the 
level of wage bargaining and the level of coordination among employers and trade 
unions. A wage bargaining system is characterized as centralized or decentralized, 
depending on the extent that wages are decided at the national level, or at the firm level 
respectively—negotiations at the industry (sector) level is the intermediate case. 
National level bargaining does not necessarily result in a uniform wage, since it often 
includes negotiations for wages by sector, or region. A wage bargaining system is 
characterized as coordinated if wage negotiations between unions, employers, and the 
government are coordinated, either through national bargaining, or through other formal 
or informal mechanisms when wage negotiations are taking place at the sector, regional, 
or firm level. The indices in Table 3a, 3b and 3c from OECD (1997 and 2004) take 
values from 1 to 5, with 1 for the lowest level of centralization or coordination. Many 
euro area countries have centralized and highly coordinated collective bargaining 
systems, and particularly Italy, Austria, Germany, and Norway, as well as high 
bargaining coverage and trade union density. The overall trend in OECD countries is 
towards more decentralized wage bargaining systems, although with very reluctant 















Australia  4.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 
Austria  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Belgium  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Canada  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Denmark  3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 
Finland  4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
France  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Germany  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Italy  3.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Japan  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Netherlands  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
New Zealand  3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 
Norway  3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Portugal  3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 
Spain  4.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 
Sweden  4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Switzerland  3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
UK  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
USA  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 







Collective Bargaining Characteristics of Selected OECD Countries, 1980-2000 








Australia  4.5 4.0 2.0 2.0 
Austria  4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Belgium  4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 
Canada  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Denmark  3.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 
Finland  4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
France  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Germany  4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Italy  3.5 2.0 3.0 4.0 
Japan  4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Netherlands  4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 
New Zealand  4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 
Norway  3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Portugal  3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 
Spain  4.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 
Sweden  3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Switzerland  4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
UK  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
USA  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Source: OECD (1997 and 2004) 
 
In the analysis that follows, the degree of coordination is chosen as an indicator of 
the centralization of the wage bargaining system. The literature has argued that even in 
decentralized wage bargaining systems, the wage outcome will be the same as in 
centralized bargaining system when there is a high degree of coordination (Flanagan 
(1999), OECD (2004), and Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini (2003)). Even if 
wages are determined at the firm or industry level, high coordination between unions, 
employers’ organizations and the government produces the same outcome as in a 
system of wage bargaining at the national level (OECD, 1997). As noted by Flanagan 
(1999), “…(the) bargaining level is then the form but not the substance of the 
bargaining system…empirical work stemming from the bargaining level literature 
misclassifies (as decentralized) those countries with company level negotiations in 
which bargaining outcomes are in fact highly coordinated across bargaining pairs…” 
and “given the many ambiguities in measures of bargaining centralization,…measures 
of bargaining coordination seem preferable to measures of bargaining level.” 
The sample includes the regions of the following countries: Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The choice of 
the countries in the sample is based on data availability in the Regional Statistics of  
Eurostat (various issues), which is the source for all data but the index of coordination 
of the wage bargaining system, which comes from OECD (1997 and 2004). The 
definition of the regions follows Eurostat. The sample includes 220 regions. The 
regression is estimated as a pooled panel of five-year averages, with or without fixed 
region and time effects, but also with random effects in some specifications to test 
robustness of the results. The estimation period is from 1980 to 2000. 869 
The dependent variable is the difference between the wage in a region and the 
wage in the whole country of this region, measured as the absolute value of 1 minus the 
ratio of the wage in a region with the national wage (absolute values are taken because 
the estimation attempts to find the determinants of regional wage differentials 
regardless if they are positive or negative). The independent variables include: the 
lagged regional labor productivity differential compared with the labor productivity in 
the respective country, the lagged regional unemployment differential compared with 
the unemployment rate in the respective country (both measured the same way as the 
regional wage differential), and the OECD index of coordination of the wage 
bargaining system in each country (this is the same for each region within the same 
country). The regional productivity and unemployment differentials are included with 
one lag to address causality concerns. 
The results in Table 4 suggest that coordination in wage bargaining and regional 
wage dispersion seem to be linked. The panel is estimated first as a pool and then with 
fixed region effects, with random region effects and with fixed region and time effects. 
The Hausman test implies that the specification should include fixed effects as opposed 
to random effects. Also, both region and time effects are statistically significant. The 
estimate of the coordination index is negative and statistically significant at the 10 
percent level in the pooled panel regression and at the 1 percent level in the regressions 
with fixed and random region effects. 
Table 4 
Regional Wage Differentiation and Wage Bargaining in the EU, 1980-2000 












































Adj. R-squared  0.25  0.63  0.11  0.66 
Observations 220  220 220 220 
Note: The sample includes 220 regions from following countries: Belgium,Germany,Spain, 
France,Italy, Netherlands,Austria,Portugal,Sweden and the UK.The definition of the regions 
follows Eurostat.The data are five- year averages for the period 1980 to 2000.The dependent 
variable is the difference between the wage in a region and the wage in the whole country of this 
region, measured as the absolute value of 1 minus the ratio of the wage in a region with the 
national wage 
Although still with the right sign, the estimate is significant only at the 15 percent 
level in the regression with both fixed region and time effects. Despite the fact that the 
level of significance is not always high, one could say that according to these results a 
high level of coordination seems to be linked to low regional wage differentiation. The 
estimate of the unemployment differential is positive, as would be expected, but not 870 
always statistically significant. The estimate of the productivity differential is also 
positive and statistically significant but in the regression with the fixed region effects, 
in which, although significant, has the wrong sign. The estimation with fixed effects 
explains 66 percent of the variation in regional wages. 
Institutions are often assumed to be exogenous, but labor market institutions do 
change over time. Although the change of labor market institutions is usually very slow, 
some causality concerns may be justified. Furthermore, it could be the case that 
countries without large regional wage differentials adopt a centralized wage bargaining 
system, rather than the other way around. The estimation with fixed effects addresses 
the later concern, but the first concern could be addressed only by estimation with 
instrumental variables. 
Results from estimation with instrumental variables suggest an even stronger link 
between coordination in wage bargaining and regional wage dispersion. The 
instruments include the lagged values of the coordination and centralization indices. 
The estimates of the coordination index in Table 5 are now statistically significant at the 




Regional Wage Differentiation and Wage Bargaining in the EU. 
Estimation with Instrumental Variables. 1980-2000 


















Adj. R-squared  0.62 0.65 
Observations  220 220 
Note: The sample includes 220 regions from the following countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The definition of the regions 
follows Eurostat. The data are five- year averages for the period 1980 to 2000.The dependent 
variable is the difference between the wage in a region and the wage in the whole country of this 
region, measured as the absolute value of 1 minus the ratio of the wage in a region with the 
national wage. The instruments include the lagged values of the coordination and centralization 
indices. 
 
Results from regressions with interaction terms suggest that the impact of the 
coordination in wage bargaining on regional wage differentiation depends on 
productivity differentials but not on unemployment differentials. The results in Table 6 
show that the estimate of the coordination index remains positive and statistically 
significant at least at the 10 percent level when an interaction term with unemployment 
differentials is included. In contrast, the interaction term has the wrong sign and is 
statistically insignificant. However, when an interaction term with the productivity 
differentials is included, the estimate of the coordination index loses its significance. In 
contrast, the interaction term is negative and statistically insignificant at least at the 10 
percent level. This suggests that in countries with large regional productivity 871 
differentials, regional wages reflect these differentials to a smaller extent than otherwise 
if the wage bargaining system is coordinated. In countries with no regional productivity 
differentials, which also suggest that wage differentials linked to productivity are small, 
the wage bargaining system does not seem to matter. 
 
Table 6 
Regional Wage Differentiation and Wage Bargaining in the EU. 
Estimation with Interaction Terms. 1980-2000. 
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Adj. R-squared  0.63  0.66  0.64  0.67 
Observations 220  220  220  220 
Note: The sample includes 220 regions from the following countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The definition of the regions 
follows Eurostat. The data are five- year averages for the period 1980 to 2000.The dependent 
variable is the difference between the wage in a region and the wage in the whole country of this 
region, measured as the absolute value of 1 minus the ratio of the wage in a region with the 
national wage. 
 
Using Italy as an example—the country with the highest regional unemployment 
disparities in the sample, the second lowest regional wage variation in the euro area, 
and a centralized and coordinated wage bargaining system—the results imply that 
regional wage differentials are likely to increase if a more decentralized wage 
bargaining system were adopted. If Italy’s coordination index were to decline from its 
current value of 4 to 1, which is the minimum value of the index, regional wage 
differences would increase by between 52 percent and 60 percent, depending on the 
specification, keeping everything else constant. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The theoretical literature has argued that a centralized/coordinated wage bargaining 
system may cause low regional wage differentiation and high regional unemployment 
differentials. Empirical evidence in this paper for EU regions suggests that, indeed, 
highly coordinated wage bargaining systems and low regional wage differentiation are 872 
linked: countries with less coordinated wage bargaining systems have higher regional 
wage differentials after controlling for regional productivity and unemployment 
differentials. 
The results are robust to fixed effects estimation and to estimation with 
instrumental variables, suggesting that it is the wage bargaining system that influences 
regional wage differentiation rather than the other way around. The empirical evidence 
suggests that a more decentralized wage bargaining system could increase regional 
wage differentiation, particularly in countries with high regional productivity 
differentials. Using the case of Italy as an example, the economic significance of the 
results is shown to be large. 
The results should be treated as only suggestive, since the sample of countries is 
small and with a relatively small variation in their wage bargaining characteristics (most 
countries in Europe have relatively centralized and coordinated wage bargaining 
systems). Furthermore, the statistical significance of the results is relatively low in 
some specifications, although this is not the case in the estimation with instrumental 
variables. The work on wage bargaining indices is still in progress and existing indices 
may suffer from measurement errors. To further investigate the robustness of these 
results, it would be useful for future work to increase the country sample as more data 
become available, to improve the indices of wage bargaining, and to investigate the role 
of other determinants of regional wage differentials in addition to the ones controlled 
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